Comparative Relevance of the Ethiopian Federal System to other African Polities of the Horn: First Thoughts on the Possibility of “Exporting” Multi-ethnic Federalism

Abstract

Ethiopia has been experimenting with federalism for several years now. Its accent on ethno-linguistic criteria for state formation, its constitutional recognition of the right to secession, the unusual mode of constitutional adjudication through the House of Federation (a body that is analogous to an upper house of a bicameral legislature), the de facto asymmetry that persists in spite of the de jure symmetry, the lack of explicit textual recognition of federal supremacy and the consequent parallelism/dualism noted in federal practice, among other things, have attracted attention both in academic and non-academic circles. This article seeks to reflect upon whether the Ethiopian federal experiment can offer some lessons to other countries of the Horn of Africa who feel the similar burden of diversity, conflict, and insecurity. In other words, it inquires into the “exportability” of the Ethiopian brand of federalism. In so doing, it first seeks to descriptively situate federalism in Ethiopia’s past and present. Then it weighs the (ir)relevance of the Ethiopian federal experiment to the countries in the sub-region by looking into the significance of multi-ethnic federalism for internal peace and stability, for entrenchment of ethno-cultural justice and for governance of diversity, and for the prospect of regional integration. In the quest for a potential ‘market’ to export to, this piece reflects on the factors that facilitate the migration of law (e.g. success at home, prestige abroad, and the psychology of the countries of the sub-region which inevitably is informed by a history of chequered relations, etc). In this way, it seeks to examine the comparative relevance of the Ethiopian federal experiment to other countries with a common set of ailments to deal with.